The 1990s witnessed historic reductions in breast cancer mortality. Striking increases in screening mammography-rates more than doubled from 1987 to 2000 among prime age women-are widely seen as responsible for a substantial share of these improvements, though we know very little about what caused mammography rates to increase. In this paper we show that state mandates requiring private insurers to cover mammography significantly contributed to the large increase in screening rates. We use data on over half a million 25-64 year old women from the CDC's Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System. Our empirical strategy exploits variation in the timing of mandate adoption across states as well as in the ages of women targeted by each law, resulting in triple difference estimates of the effects of mammography mandates. We find robust evidence that state insurance mandates requiring coverage of an annual mammogram significantly increased past year mammography screenings by about 8 percent, and these effects are plausibly concentrated among insured women. Moreover, we find that the mammography mandates had no effects on the probability a woman obtains cervical cancer screenings or clinical breast exams (which were not explicitly targeted by mandates). Our results confirm that regulating private insurance markets to require coverage for relatively low-cost services such as mammograms can have meaningful effects on population preventive health behaviors.
Introduction
Breast cancer is the most commonly diagnosed cancer and the second leading cause of cancer death among women in the United States; 40,000 women die of breast cancer each year. Early detection of breast cancer through regular screening mammograms is commonly understood to be the most important determinant of survival. Cutler (2008) , for example, documents that increases in routine cancer screenings such as mammography represent the most important factor behind the reversal in age-adjusted cancer mortality rates that occurred in the 1990s. Indeed, the increase in population mammography rates was particularly broad-based from 1987 to 2000: screening rates among 25-64 year old women approximately doubled for women of different race/ethnicity, marital status, education, and even household income groups.
1 As such, the increase in mammography over the 1990s is arguably one of the more striking improvements in women's preventive public health behaviors.
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What factors contributed to this substantial increase in mammography among prime age women? Surprisingly, there is extremely little evidence on the policy determinants of these broad-based improvements. In this paper we provide the first comprehensive assessment of the utilization effects of state laws requiring private insurers to cover screening mammograms. These "mammography mandates" were adopted by nearly every state in the US from 1987 to 2000, making mammograms one of the most commonly conducted medical procedures whose coverage is specifically 1 Figure 2 shows these trends for all women age 25-64 and for subgroups of women of different ages. We focus here on prime age women to abstract from public policy effects on mammography use among Medicare-eligible women, which has already received a great deal of attention (see Card, Dobkin, and Maestas, 2008a and 2008b for discussions of health care utilization effects of Medicare, and see Kelaher and Stellman 2000 for a policy analysis of the effects of changes in reimbursement of mammography among the Medicare population. 2 Over this same time period, rates of Pap test rates for cervical cancer among 25-64 year old women were essentially flat.
Insurance Mandates and Mammography
Of course, there are several reasons why mammography mandates may have had no effects or even negative effects on mammography utilization. In addition to the somewhat limited potential coverage of mandates (mostly due to ERISA exemptions), some researchers and policymakers have also argued that benefits mandates such as those we study here cause some employers-particularly small firms-to reduce offers of health insurance. Finally, it is possible that mandates largely codified the benefits that were already being offered by insurance plans. As such, the relationship between mammography insurance mandates and mammography use is ultimately an empirical question.
To evaluate the utilization effects of state mammography mandates, we draw on data with information about mammography use for over a half million women from the 1987-2000 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), a publicly available dataset from the Centers for Disease Control that is designed to be representative at the state level in each year. The BRFSS questionnaires have asked women about mammography screenings since 1987, and the data also include standard demographic characteristics for the survey respondents. A standard empirical approach in this setting would take advantage of the staggered timing of adoption of the state insurance mandates across states in a difference in differences (DD) framework with state and year fixed effects, as well as controls for individual-level characteristics (e.g., age, race, education, and marital status), annual state economic and demographic characteristics, and other relevant public policies that may affect health insurance coverage, access, and screening outcomes. Our approach for identifying the effects of the mammography mandates on outcomes makes use of additional variation induced by the age-specific nature of to 49, and 50 and older, thus providing no treatment to women age 34 and younger).
Thus, we can estimate fully interacted triple difference models that control for state by age group effects, year by age group effects, and a full set of state by year dummies. In these augmented models, the effects of the mandates are identified from differences in mammography screenings for women whose age makes them treated compared to the associated outcomes for women whose age makes them untreated coincident with the timing of policy adoption within each state.
To preview, we find strong evidence that state mandates for screening mammography-particularly mandates requiring insurance plans to cover annual mammograms-have statistically significant and economically meaningful effects on recent and lifetime mammography rates. Specifically, we estimate that adoption of an annual cover mandate increases past year mammography rates by about 8 percent relative to the baseline. This result is highly robust to a variety of specification checks. State mammography mandates also changed the stated reasons for having obtained mammograms (reducing the probability a woman was screened and reports her most recent mammogram was due to a problem and increasing the probability a woman was screened and reports her most recent mammogram was part of a routine screening). We also confirm that the mandate effects are plausibly driven by effects among insured women. We find no evidence that the mandates affected Pap tests or clinical breast exams, suggesting that the mandate effects are unique to mammography and are not reflecting other unobserved determinants of women's health more generally. We
Insurance Mandates and Mammography p. 5 estimate that mandates for annual coverage of mammograms can account for about 7 percent of the total increase in the annual mammography rate in the population from 1987 to 2000. Our results have important implications for debates about the most effective ways to increase other types of preventive behaviors that are at levels far below wellaccepted medical recommendations, such as screenings for colon and prostate cancer.
Specifically, our results suggest that private insurance market regulations have the potential to play an important role at improving preventive public health behaviors.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 outlines institutional details regarding mammography and the insurance mandates under study. Section 3 briefly describes the previous literature, and we describe the research design in Section 4. Section 5 describes the data and empirical approach. Section 6 presents the main results, and Section 7 concludes.
Institutional Details
Mammography is the standard approach for screening women for early detection of breast cancer. In mammography, a woman's breasts are placed on a machine that takes low-dose X-ray pictures to check for abnormalities. Screening mammography is different from diagnostic mammography in that the latter is typically done in the presence of a physician with on-site interpretation of the results, while the former can be done in a variety of settings and is not generally read on-site. Diagnostic mammography usually occurs when a woman has had a previous abnormal screening mammogram (approximately 10% of those screened in the early 1990s), as well as among women with a family history of breast cancer (Dans and Wright 1996) . In addition to diagnostic More precisely, these mandates cover private plans where the risk is not taken on by the purchaser. So, employers who self-insure and take on the risk of the insurance themselves are exempt from such mandates via ERISA. Despite this large ERISA exemption, many employees are still likely to be covered by these mandates. Bitler and Schmidt (2009) find that 14-19% of private employees were enrolled in a plan affected by mandates involving infertility treatment (which have only been passed in 15 states). 7 There has not, however, been uniform agreement across major medical organizations with respect to these recommendations. The US Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF), for example, did not recommend annual screening mammography for women over age 40 until 2002-prior to this, the USPSTF only recommended annual mammograms for women age 50 and older (i.e., the pre-1997 ACS guidelines). Despite the fact that different organizations have used different age cutoffs for screening mammography recommendations, a study by Rathore et al. (2000) shows that the ACS guidelines are the ones that are most commonly applied in state mammography mandates. For our preferred triple difference models described below, it is important to note that our estimates of the effects of mandates will rely only on variation at the state by age group by year level coincident with the timing of mandate adoption; any p. 7
In recognition of these changes, some of the mammography mandates adopted in the latter part of our sample period revised pre-existing guidelines to require plans to cover (or less commonly offer) annual mammography screenings for women age 40 and older.
Moreover, a handful of states have used different age-based cutoffs in their laws, and these laws provide us additional age by state by year variation in our triple difference models below. For example, Wisconsin's 1990 law requires coverage for two mammograms for women age 45 to 49, provided they have not had one within two years (i.e., this law mandated coverage of nearly biennial mammography beginning at age 45).
The District of Columbia's 1990 law did not set any explicit age limits, which we interpret as requiring coverage for annual screening mammography for all women.
Texas' 1987 mandate requires coverage for annual mammograms for all women age 35 and older. As such, there is substantial age by state by year variation in the types of treatments espoused in state laws that forms the basis of our identification in the DDD empirical models below.
In addition to the age groups targeted by the laws, the other important distinction that we focus on here for the mammography mandates is whether the law is a cover mandate or an offer mandate. Cover mandates require privately sold plans to include coverage of mammography while offer mandates only require that insurers offer at least one such plan to an employer. We would typically expect offer mandates to be weaker than cover mandates (i.e., have smaller effects on utilization) since the latter should more strongly reduce barriers to screening mammography for those privately insured women recommendations from major medical organizations will be absorbed by the age group times year interactions since, although the recommendations themselves are age-based, they are nationwide guidelines (i.e., not state-specific). Dobkin, and Maestas, 2008a, 2008b) , and the fact that the laws we evaluated refer to private insurance, we focus on women under age 65 in our analysis. These studies, however, are clearly related to the questions we study here since they relate to the utilization effects of changes in public policy related to insurance coverage of mammography. Kelaher and Stellman (2000) Finally, the lack of research on mammography benefits mandates also contrasts markedly with other types of state level insurance benefit mandates, some of which have received a great deal of attention. Pregnancy benefits, (Gruber 1994a) , infertility treatment (Bitler 2008 , Schmidt 2007 , Bundorf, Henne, and Baker 2007 , Buckles 2008 , and others), mental health parity (Pacula and Sturm 2000 , Harris, Carpenter, and Bao 2007 , Busch and Barry 2008 , and overnight hospital stays for newborn deliveries (Liu, Dow, and Norton 2004) are just some of the examples of mandated insurance benefits that have generated substantial literatures.
Importantly, researchers have identified a number of considerations for understanding the extent to which any mandated benefits laws should be expected to affect utilization. First, it is commonly argued that mandated benefits laws could cause employers-particularly small firms-to reduce offers of health insurance in response to the rising costs when mandated benefits laws are adopted. While the empirical evidence on this is very mixed (Gruber 1994b , Jensen and Gabel 1989 , Jensen and Morrisey 1999 , any such effects would reduce the potential for benefits mandates to affect utilization.
Second, as we noted above, certain insurance plans are exempted from compliance requirements with any state health insurance mandates. The largest of these is the exemption because of ERISA for self-funded insurance plans which generally affects large employers. Buchmueller et. al. (2007) use the MEPS-IC and find that this is the most important factor that reduces the potential population covered by mental health screening, suggesting a large increase in mammography coverage over a period of significant mandate adoption. These patterns indicate that: 1) private insurance coverage of these services was far from universal at the time the first mandates were adopted; and 12 We do not know, however, whether these figures refer to screening mammography or diagnostic mammography, though popular press suggests that private plan coverage of diagnostic mammograms was far greater than those for screening mammograms (Brozan 1986 ). This would suggest even greater latitude for benefits mandates to have changed actual benefits coverage over our time period.
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2) this rate increased substantially over the 1990s, such that private insurance coverage of mammography was nearly universal by 2000.
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Finally, it is natural to ask-given the fairly low cost of low-dose screening mammography ($50-$150 per screening according to Breen and Brown 1994) 14 -why weren't all employers and health plans covering these screenings even in the absence of a mandate? Note that although the cost of an individual screening is relatively low, the population at risk of using a mandate is very large: currently, all women age 40 and older are recommended to get regular screening mammograms annually. In contrast, most benefits mandates that have been studied previously (e.g., infertility treatment, substance use/alcoholism treatment) have the potential to affect a much smaller portion of the population and are for services that are used far less frequently than are screening mammography. Finally, even though the direct costs of the actual screening are fairly low, the subsequent costs associated with a positive screening-biopsy, mastectomy, and other cancer treatments-can be much larger. Like many screening tests, mammography tests have a high false positive rate: given that upwards of 10 percent of screening mammograms can produce abnormal results, these costs are potentially very large. Poplack et al. (2005) , for example, used New Hampshire mammography registry data to find that 13 percent of women had diagnostic imaging after a screening. Total direct costs per capita (using Medicare reimbursement rates) were $99 per woman if the women 13 There are, of course, other reasons why mandates could have limited effects on utilization other than those we list here. For example, individuals may not be aware that they are covered by or eligible for such benefits and/or individuals may not be able to afford the copayments and deductibles associated with obtaining the benefits (since these are generally not regulated by state insurance mandates). 14 We are not aware of good estimates of how the costs of mammography have changed over time.
Mammography technology, however, seems not to have changed substantially over the period we study. More recently, however, computer-aided detection (CAD), designed to assist radiologists in reviewing suspicious areas of the breast, has increased. The Food and Drug Administration approved the first use of CAD in June 1998, though their use was very rare through 2001. The clinical efficacy of CAD has not been fully documented (Fenton et al. 2007 ).
only had screening mammograms but rose to $286 per woman with diagnostic imaging and $993 per woman if there was a biopsy. The overall total cost of $124 was therefore substantially higher than the costs of screening mammography alone. 
Research Design
We are interested in identifying the casual effects of state laws requiring private insurers within a state to cover or offer screening mammography on population mammography
rates. An obvious concern with the raw associations between mandates and mammography use is that unobserved characteristics about women living in states with mandates may contribute both to screening behaviors and to policy adoption.
Alternatively, there were other changes to the health care delivery system over our time period that could introduce bias: HMO penetration increased over this time period in a way that was plausibly correlated with policy adoption, for example, and it is generally believed that HMOs are particularly good at increasing use of preventive services. A third way in which simple correlations might be misleading is if states engaged in public outreach efforts that corresponded with the timing of and age groups affected by the mandates. In all three of these cases, the association between the mammography mandates and screening outcomes is likely to be overstated.
The standard approach in economics and policy evaluation to deal with these potential omitted variables is to use variation in the timing of adoption of the policies in 15 Note that ideally we would observe the marginal premium cost of adding mammograms to the policy. Following Gruber (1994b) and others, we searched for information about the share of premium costs due to mammography mandates. Evidence from a 2000 Texas Department of Insurance report on the cost of mandates suggests that the Texas mandate for mammography screening was responsible for 0.6% of total premium costs. This figure is smaller than the analogous premium shares for the 5 mandates identified as "expensive" in Gruber 1994b but is still substantial and similar in magnitude to benefits related to alcohol treatment, chiropractor services, and continuation of health insurance coverage (Gruber 1994b) . state-and year-level fixed effects models of mammography use. To the extent that the unobserved factors contributing both to outcomes and to policy adoption are time invariant within a state or within a year, the two-way fixed effects models will remove this bias. Moreover, direct controls for adoption of other relevant programs, policies, and state characteristics (such as managed care and HMO penetration) can further reduce the omitted variables bias problem. In these difference-in-differences models the key identifying assumption is that there were no other unobserved shocks to outcomes coincident with policy adoption that affected screening outcomes.
Of course, it is certainly not the case that all women should have been treated by the policies. Indeed, previous research has argued that one reason benefits mandates (and direct access laws) may have limited effects is that that many people with private health insurance are actually not subject to the mandates because they work for large firms with self-funded health plans that are exempted from state mandates through ERISA provisions (and additionally often may already cover the services in question). One could imagine incorporating these other behavioral dimensions directly into the estimation to estimate triple difference models using some variant of health insurance, employment status, firm size, being offered private health insurance coverage, or HMO participation as a way to identify the treatment group of interest. This approach has at least two direct limitations in our context. First, over the sample period of interest, the BRFSS does not consistently include variables that could proxy for women's having private health insurance that would not be subject to the ERISA exemption (e.g., own/spouse's employment status, firm size, having a private plan offered, or being covered by an we might be concerned that many of these characteristics (e.g., firm size, whether the individual takes up coverage, whether the firm offers coverage) are themselves choices and decisions that could be correlated in important ways with the unobserved determinants of outcomes or could directly respond to the presence of the mandates.
Fortunately, our setting for the mammography insurance mandates allows another source of variation in addition to the staggered timing of mandate adoption and on a margin that is clearly exogenous: age. As described above, most state mammography mandates have age-based rules regarding the frequency with which mammography is required to be included as part of the cover or offer mandates. The age-based variation means that we can relax the identification assumption in the difference in differences model by including age group by state, age group by year, and state by year fixed effects in a triple difference setting similar to that proposed by Gruber (1994a) . In this augmented model we identify the effects of the mammography mandates on outcomes only using the variation in outcomes for "treated" women at or above the age-based eligibility threshold relative to outcomes for "control" women under the age-based eligibility threshold coincident with timing of mandate adoption. Note that any nationwide age-specific confounders such as age-based cancer screening guidelines adopted by major medical organizations are subsumed by the age group by year interactions. State by age group fixed effects further control for time invariant differences across women of different ages within each state. 16 In fact, over our time period BRFSS only consistently reports whether the respondent is covered by any health plan and whether the respondent is employed (working for wages and salaries or self-employed). From 1996-2000 there are more detailed questions about the source of health insurance coverage, though even in these years there is still no information on firm size or whether the plan is self-funded.
The key advantage of this fully interacted DDD specification is that most of the other important likely confounders such as HMO penetration, the extent of self-insurance within the state, and/or other state laws relating to health insurance and women's health do not plausibly vary by age. For example, it is extremely unlikely that 35 year old women (who are generally treated by the mandates we study) are differentially likely to be enrolled in HMOs or to work for firms that self-insure compared to 34 year old women. It is even less plausible that any such age differences are correlated with the mandates. In any case, these other factors that do not vary by age are completely accounted for when we include a full set of state by year indicators. 17 As such, the only remaining threats to identification in the fully interacted model are those omitted variables that are themselves age-specific in the same way as the mandates and that are correlated with the timing of mandate adoption. Such biases are likely to be very small.
Data Description and Empirical Approach
Our main data come from the Center for Disease Control's Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS We also observe standard demographic characteristics in the BRFSS, including age, race, education, marital status, family income (in ranges), and employment status.
23
The BRFSS also includes a very basic measure of health insurance coverage: we are able 21 Item non-response is fairly low for these questions. We omit observations with a "don't know" or "refused" response to the mammogram questions. 22 Note that we lack information on the exact timing of the most recent mammogram (beyond first year, second year, or later). 23 We choose not to control directly for employment or household income in the regression models below due to their likely endogeneity with our outcomes and key variables of interest. Additionally, household income is missing for a large share of the sample. Finally, the cutoffs for the income ranges do not vary over time and are thus not defining constant percentiles of the income distribution.
to identify whether the woman is covered by "any health plan", though for our main sample period we cannot distinguish who pays for the plan, what the plan covers, whether the plan is in her own name, whether it is a public plan, and other important related questions.
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To estimate the effect of the various public policies on outcomes we use straightforward difference-in-difference and augmented triple difference models that identify the effects of the mandates using variation across states in the timing of adoption and in the ages of women treated by the various policies. We begin with the fully saturated triple difference model, which embeds the difference in differences specification. Specifically, we formulate the triple difference model as: There is a great deal of variation across states in the language regarding when the laws are supposed to take effect. Some states set a date after which "all policies sold or renewed after that date" must comply with the mandate, while others state that benefits must be changed effective immediately. We have coded plans as taking effect January 1 of the year after the year in which they are passed, with the logic that most policies are negotiated in the fall to take effect at the beginning of the following calendar year. 27 Our policy data come from the National Cancer Institute's State Cancer Legislative Database (SCLD). SCLD tracks every piece of legislation pertaining to different types of cancers, including breast cancer. We used a SCLD-produced table showing every state's mammography mandate activity that included information on substantive revisions to the state laws, the year and quarter of law adoption, the age groups and mammography frequency described in the law, whether the law is an offer or a cover mandate, whether the law applies to the state's Medicaid program, and whether the law applies to public employees within the state (usually through the state's medical plan for public employees). To verify the information in the SCLD table we next consulted actual text of each state's laws by calling up individual records in SCLD. Discrepancies were discussed between the two authors. Our information on state participation in the NBCCEDP program comes from personal correspondence with Janet Royalty at the CDC. Our information on direct access laws comes from Baker and Chan (2007) . 28 Note that the BRFSS questions introduce a "reference window" problem due to the fact that the questions typically ask about screening behavior over some recent period. Given this, it is important to account for the systematic BRFSS interview structure when defining someone as treated by the policy in question. Specifically, we can make use of the fact that BRFSS interviews are distributed almost uniformly across the calendar year. This information, coupled with our decision rule regarding when individuals are first treated, means that we can create a more precise treatment variable that captures the share of the recent period that the individual was treated by the mammography mandate. The intuition here is straightforward: since we define a policy to turn "on" in January 1 of the year following adoption, it is true that people interviewed in, say, February of what we define as the first treatment year will have only been exposed to two months of treatment while people interviewed in, say, November of that same year in that same state will have been exposed to 11 months of treatment. Similarly, for the past two year outcomes we code individuals interviewed in January after the adoption year as being treated 1/24, February of the adoption Dummy variables for each state are captured by S s , and in the DD models, control for time-invariant state-specific factors. Dummy variables for each survey year are captured by T t , and in the DD specifications, control for period-specific shocks common to all states in any given year. 29 S s *A a is a full set of state by age group dummies, T t *A a is a full set of year by age group dummies, and S s *T t is a full set of state by year dummies. 30 The T t *A a indicators remove biases common to all women of a particular age in a given year; for example, the introduction of age-specific screening guidelines on a national level. The S s *A a indicators account for other age-specific state effects which would arise, for example, if a certain state targeted women of a certain age through education campaigns. Finally, the full set of state by year interactions S s *T t account for any other efforts to increase mammography rates in a particular state and year that would be expected to affect women of different ages equally (e.g., general education campaigns, other laws that are not age-specific). In this augmented triple difference model, the coefficients of interest, β 2 -β 4 , use variation at the age by state by year levels to identify the effects of screening mammography mandates from differences in screening rates for year as being treated 2/24, and so forth, until December of the following year (i.e., December in the second year after adoption) as being fully treated (i.e., 24/24). Note that even if our assumptions about when insurance policies reset are incorrect, it remains the case that people interviewed toward the beginning of the calendar year after implementation will, by construction, have less potential treatment than individuals interviewed toward the end of the calendar year no matter when the policy was implemented. Finally, note that since we do not observe birth date information in the BRFSS we are incorrectly coding some fraction of the reference window for people who "aged into" eligibility within the reference window (generally people who turned age 35, 40, or 50 within the reference window). Given a uniform distribution of birthdays and correct self-reports of age, this measurement error will result in attenuation of our coefficients of interest. 29 We also include month of interview dummies throughout (though not shown in the equation) to account for idiosyncratic month effects (e.g., October is Breast Cancer Awareness Month). 30 Note that throughout our reported DDD specifications we are controlling for age using 5-year age group dummies and their associated interactions with state and year fixed effects. We also experimented with estimating a fully flexible specification that included single year of age dummies and their associated interactions with each state and year fixed effect, and results were nearly identical to those reported in all cases, suggesting that we are not losing much by failing to account for the sharp single-year-of-age differences in mammography among 35 to 45 year-old women evident in Figure 1 . For computational ease we report the specifications that control for age-group dummies instead of single-year-of-age dummies. 
Insurance Mandates and Mammography

Results
In Figure 1 we show the age distribution of the probability that women received a mammogram in the past two years for women age 25-64. As has been well established, mammography rates are strongly increasing in age, particularly starting around age 35.
There are noticeable sharp increases in mammography rates at age 35 and again at age 40 that are likely due to the mammography screening recommendations from the American Cancer Society and other organizations. There is not, however, a visible increase at age 50 despite that the ACS and USPSTF both had an age-50 recommendation regarding annual mammograms for much of the early part of the sample.
In Figure 2 we show the trend from 1987 to 2000 for past year mammography use. We present trends for four age groups: 25 to 34 year olds (who were almost never treated by mammography mandates), 35 to 39 year olds (who were usually targeted in provisions calling for baseline mammograms), 40 to 49 year olds (who were usually targeted in provisions calling for biennial mammograms), and 50 to 64 year olds (who were usually targeted in provisions calling for annual mammograms). Several features are notable in Figure 2 . First, there was almost no improvement in recent mammography for women age 25 to 34 years old; this fact is rarely reported in the public health 31 Baker and Chan (2007) The patterns of demographic characteristics across groups indicates that most of the sample for each age group is white non-Hispanic, while about ten percent of the sample is black non-Hispanic, and nine percent of the sample is Hispanic. Educational attainment is predictably higher for younger women compared to the women age 50-64.
Over two-thirds of the sample is married and over 60 percent is employed. Over 85 percent of women report that they have a health care plan. Nearly one quarter of women reports household incomes greater than $50,000. Finally, note that other nonmammography screening levels (past year Pap tests and clinical breast exams) are fairly regularly high across age groups-much higher than the associated mammography rates below in Table 2 -and show the opposite age patterns (i.e., younger women are more likely to obtain these screenings).
Regarding health outcomes and the policy variables in Table 2 , we find that, as seen in Figure 1 , mammography rates are strongly increasing with age, and the same is true when we consider whether the woman reports her most recent mammogram was routine. Table 2 also shows that there is a much weaker age gradient for screenings due to problems. We also show in Table 2 the means of our policy variables of interest, and we show two variants of the policy coding. The top variables show means of the contemporaneously coded policies while the bottom variables show means of the "share of the previous year" policies that take into account the reference windows for past year outcomes. These variables illustrate the substantial age-specific variation in the key policy variables of interest. Specifically, note that 25 to 34 year olds are never treated by cover or offer mandates except for a handful of state laws that require annual coverage for all women in the state. The age-specific targeting of the mammography mandates is women in other age groups) to be treated by cover and offer mandates regarding biennial screening mammograms, and 50 to 64 year olds are the most likely to be treated by cover and offer mandates regarding annual screening mammograms. Note also that there is some additional age-specific variation with respect to the mandates induced by the fact that a handful of mandates differ from the modal age-based laws. This can be seen in the fact that some small but meaningful fraction of 35 to 39 year olds are also treated by annual cover and offer mandates. This is particularly true for 40 to 49 year olds, many of whom are treated by annual cover and offer mandates in the later years of the sample period when several states moved their age of eligibility for annual mammograms from 50 to 40 in response to changes in the cancer screening guidelines of some major medical organizations.
We present the first set of results in Table 3 for the Mammogram in the Past Year outcome. We present coefficient estimates on the key mandate variables of interest, and in each column we add successively more controls. Column 1 shows the raw association net of age group dummies, Pap screening mandates, NBCCEDP programs, and direct access laws. Column 2 adds individual demographic characteristics. Column 3 adds the state economic and demographic variables, as well as the remaining policies in the Z vector (e.g., welfare reform). Column 4 adds state, year, and month fixed effects and is akin to the standard difference in differences approach that relies on the staggered timing Table 3 shows results for the model that includes only the policy variables directly related to mammography screening, Pap screening, NBCCEDP programs, direct access laws, and age group indicators; we report coefficients only for the mandate variables. The results in column 1 of Table 3 indicate that there is a strong raw association between most of the mandates and the probability that a woman age 25-64
reports having had a mammogram in the past year. For example, the presence of cover mandate for annual mammography is associated with a 4.9 percentage point increase in the probability of past year mammography screening. In the second and third columns we find that these relationships are largely unchanged when we control for individual and state demographic characteristics and other state policies. In column 4 we control for unrestricted state and year fixed effects, and the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates fall substantially for every policy variable, though nearly all remain statistical significant at conventional levels.
32
Turning to our preferred augmented DDD model in column 5 with a full set of two-way interactions for age, state, and year, we continue to find that cover mandates for annual mammography significantly increase the probability of having had a mammogram in the past year by 1.5 percentage points, or about 8 percent of the baseline annual 32 Note that the point estimates on the offer mandates are generally larger than the point estimates on the associated cover mandates in Columns 1 through 4 of Table 3 . Because of the much smaller number of states with offer mandates, however, the standard errors on the offer mandate coefficients are also much larger than those on the cover mandates, and none of the differences between offer and cover mandates is statistically significant. As we discuss below, the offer mandate estimates are also more sensitive to specification and choice of outcome variable than our main result for annual cover mandates. Finally, because such a small number of states implement offer mandates, we suspect some of these significant findings are due to the type of over-rejection possible in state-year panel estimation with a small number of policy changes (e.g., Conley and Taber, 2008) . mammography rate. 33 To get a sense of the true effect size of the annual cover mandate, one should weight up the estimate to account for the fact that only about a third of women in the BRFSS could have been directly treated by the mandate (i.e., privately insured women whose insurance is not subject to ERISA exemptions) (Butler 2000) . The true effect size of an annual cover mandate on past year mammography rates, then, is closer to 4.5 percentage points. Given that past year mammography rates increased by about 22.4 percentage points over our time period (see Figure 2) , we estimate that annual cover mandates account for about seven percent of the overall increase (1.5/22.4=6.7).
The other coefficients on the mammography mandates are also substantially smaller and generally insignificant in the DDD specification.
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In all subsequent models for mammograms we only report results from our preferred triple difference specification that includes the full set of age group, state, and year fixed effects and their two-way interactions. 35 These results are shown in Table 4 and confirm that mammography mandates are significantly related to past two-year and lifetime mammography rates, as well as the stated reasons for obtaining a mammogram.
Specifically, we estimate that cover mandates for annual mammography screening increase past two-year mammography rates by approximately 2.1 percentage points, and this effect is statistically significant. As in the past year mammography model in Table 3, 33 Also, the main results are essentially unchanged when we control for single year of age dummies (instead of 5-year age group dummies) and their associated interactions with each state and year fixed effect. For the past year mammogram outcome, for example, the coefficient estimate on the annual cover mandate variable is .015 with a standard error of .006 (versus an estimate of .015 with a standard error of .005 in the main specification). 34 Although we do find a positive and marginally significant relationship between biennial offer mandates and past year mammography rates, this estimate-and all the estimates on the offer mandate variables-are based on a very small number of state policy changes (see the bottom rows of Table 2 ) and are therefore prone to over-rejection problems (Conley and Taber 2005) . That the point estimates in column 4 are uniformly smaller than those in column 3 suggests that previous cross-sectional studies of mammography mandates have likely overstated their effects. 35 Results from the less saturated models generally produced larger associations and are available upon request.
the other mandate coefficients are generally positive but not individually statistically distinguishable from zero. In column 2 we estimate that mammography cover mandates for biennial and annual screening are estimated to significantly increase lifetime mammography use by 1.6 and 1.3 percentage points, respectively. Finally, columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 suggest that baseline mammography mandates increased the likelihood that a woman reports she received her most recent mammogram as part of a routine checkup and decreased the likelihood she reports the most recent mammogram was due to a specific problem.
36
In Table 5 we provide more direct evidence on the most likely mechanism through which mandates affect utilization: an insurance coverage channel. Specifically, we begin by estimating a triple difference model where the outcome variable is an indicator for whether the woman currently has any health plan. This is the closest variable we have to representing health insurance coverage. Recall that one possible employer response to rising costs of state mandates is to reduce offers of health insurance to employees; as such, it is possible that mandates such as those we study here could reduce health insurance coverage (though we have argued that this is unlikely given the age-specific nature of the benefits and our empirical models). In column 1 of Table 5 we show that biennial and annual breast cancer insurance mandates are not meaningfully associated with changes in health insurance coverage of women. 37 In column 2 we show 36 We also investigated the robustness of the main results for mammography to address concerns about the unbalanced panel. Tables  3 and 4 and confirmed that mammography mandates increased past year mammography rates. These results are available upon request. 37 The one exception is the findings that cover mandates for baseline mammograms are estimated to significantly increase the likelihood of reporting a health plan. Note first that this estimate is not negative, p. 30 that among insured women, there are statistically significant utilization effects of cover mandates for annual mammograms on past year mammography rates. As expected, we do not find that mandates significantly increased utilization rates among uninsured women in column 3.
In Table 6 we examine whether mandates affected other related screening behaviors by women that are also related to preventive health. Specifically, we consider Pap tests (the standard cervical cancer screening tests) and clinical breast exams (manual examinations of the breast performed by a physician that do not involve X-rays and presumably could be done during an office visit). If mandates were significantly related to women's health more generally (particularly in an age-specific way), we might be less convinced that the effects we have identified are really due to the effects of the insurance mandates and may instead be proxying for other types of outreach efforts or information campaigns regarding women's preventive health behaviors other than mammography screening for breast cancer.
We first show that the relationship between annual cover mandates and past year mammography is robust to restricting attention to the sampled years in which we observe the other outcomes: in column 1, for example, we show that 1988-2000 (when questions about Pap tests were asked), all types of cover mandates significantly increased past year mammography rates, and in column 3 we show that the main finding for annual coverage mandates is similarly robust for the period 1990-2000 (when clinical breast exam which is what one might be concerned about if mandates induce firms to reduce offers of health insurance. More importantly, the estimated relationship between annual cover mandates and health plans is very small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Since our mammography findings in the DDD models of Tables 3 and 4 are driven by the annual cover mandates, this null finding between annual cover mandates and health plans is particularly important as it suggests that the most robust utilization effects we identify are unlikely to be caused by changes in health plan coverage per se.
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p. 31 questions were asked). 38 We then directly show that the relationship between annual cover mammography mandates and past year screenings is unique to mammography.
Specifically, in columns 2 and 4 we show that neither past-year Pap tests nor past-year clinical breast exams were significantly related to mammography mandates requiring insurers to cover baseline, biennial, or annual mammograms; i.e., the breast cancer mandate effects are unique to mammography, which further supports the hypothesis that mandates affected insurance coverage for mammography only and subsequently affected utilization.
Finally, in Table 7 we provide descriptive evidence on the effects of mandates for various subgroups of women in the fully saturated DDD models. Column 1 shows that among white women there were large and statistically significant increases in past year mammography rates associated with annual cover mandates. Coefficient estimates also indicate meaningful increases in past year mammography associated with annual cover mandates for non-Hispanic black and Hispanic women, though these estimates are not statistically precise given the smaller sample sizes. In columns 4 through 7 we find that the annual cover mandates are estimated to increase past year mammography rates substantially for the least and most educated groups, though again the estimates are not individually statistically significant at conventional levels. 
Conclusion
38 All of the models in Table 6 include the full set of controls in the triple difference specification. 39 In Tables 5 and 7 we find a handful of statistically significant (and often wrong-signed) coefficients for offer mandates, though the very small number of states driving identification of these coefficients (as illustrated in the means of the policy variables in the bottom rows of Table 2 ) makes these findings subject to over-rejection concerns. Moreover, the magnitude of the significant estimates is implausibly large. future work we will use other data sources to more comprehensively evaluate the effects of these public policies on other health and labor market outcomes. 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 weighted. N is maximum possible N; a small number of observations are missing for various measures (e.g., individuals who did not answer questions about the timing of their last mammogram are not asked why they had it). Past year outcomes are the share of the prior calendar year (relative to the respondent's interview date) that a law has been in effect, assuming it first impacted health insurance policies as of January 1 of the year after it was passed. Each column shows selected coefficients from one regression. Mandate variables control for share of last calendar year law was in effect. In addition to controls for which coefficients are reported, additional controls are included as indicated in the column label. Age groups dummies for being 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59, and 60-64 included in all regressions as are controls for Pap test mandates, NBCEDPP pilot and full programs, and laws mandating access to OB/GYNs. Individual Xs added in column 2 include controls for race/ethnicity, education, and marital status. Column 3 adds controls for the following variables for each state and year: share of women 15-44 with private health insurance; share or women who work or who have a husband who works at a firm with 24 or fewer employees, 25-99 employees or 100 or more employees; the unemployment rate; welfare reform; the level of HMO penetration (as a share of the population); the number of obstetric beds per 100 women 15-44, the eligibility threshold for Medicaid eligibility for a pregnant woman in the state as a share of the FPL; and the share urban, share black, and share Hispanic in the state. Column 4 adds state, year, and month of interview fixed effects. Column 5 adds state by age group, year by age group, and state by year fixed effects. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors throughout are clustered at the state level and estimates are weighted. Table 3 but a different dependent variable. Relevant mandate variables for specifications for column 1 control for share of last two calendar years the law was in effect. Relevant mandates variables for specifications for columns 2, 3, and 4 control for whether a mandate has been implemented as of January of this year. See notes to Table 3 for description of additional control variables. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors throughout are clustered at the state level and estimates are weighted. Table 3 but a different dependent variable. Mandate controls are for share of last year mandate was in effect. Sample sizes in columns 2 and 3 do not exactly equal the sample size in column 1 because we do not exclude the small number of women with missing data on past year mammography in the model in column 1. See notes to Table 3 for list of additional control variables. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors throughout are clustered at the state level and estimates are weighted. Table 3 but estimated for a different sample. The sample in Columns 1 and 2 includes the set of states and years in which questions about Pap tests were asked. The sample is Columns 3 and 4 includes the set of states and years in which questions about clinical breast exam were asked. See notes to Table 3 for list of additional control variables. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors throughout are clustered at the state level and estimates are weighted. Table 3 but estimated for a different sample. Column 1 sample is non-Hispanic white women; column 2 sample is non-Hispanic black women; and column 3 sample is Hispanic women. Column 4 sample is women with less than a high school degree; column 5 sample is women with exactly a high school degree; column 6 sample is women with some college education; and column 7 sample is women with at least a bachelor's degree. See notes to Table 3 for list of additional control variables. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors throughout are clustered at the state level and estimates are weighted.
